Do managers keep their word? The disclosure of merger intention at pre-merger issuance and M&A performance by Guo, Jie (Michael) et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Guo, J. (M.), Li, L., Hu, N. and Wang, X. (2019) Do managers keep their 
word? The disclosure of merger intention at pre-merger issuance and M&A 
performance. Finance Research Letters, 28, pp. 20-31. 
(doi:10.1016/j.frl.2018.03.007). 
 
This is the author’s final accepted version. 
 
There may be differences between this version and the published version. 
You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from 
it. 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/159480/    
                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deposited on: 19 March 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk  
 
2 
 
 
Do Managers Keep Their Word? The Disclosure of Merger Intention at Pre-merger 
Issuance and M&A Performance 
Jie (Michael) Guo 
Email: jie.guo@durham.ac.uk 
Durham University Business School, Mill Hill Lane, Durham, DH1 3LB, UK 
Lu Li 
Email: lu.li2@durham.ac.uk 
Durham University Business School, Mill Hill Lane, Durham, DH1 3LB, UK 
Nan Hu 
Email: nan.hu@glasgow.ac.uk 
Glasgow University Adam Smith Business School. Glasgow, G12, 8QQ 
Xing Wang* 
Email: xing.wang@durham.ac.uk 
Durham University Business School, Mill Hill Lane, Durham, DH1 3LB, UK 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates whether disclosing merger intention at the announcement of equity/debt 
issuance has an impact on subsequent M&A transactions. We find that companies tend to issue 
higher proceeds when they reveal their merger intentions, and, subsequently, they are more 
likely to complete the merger deal itself and pay a higher bid premium. However, we did not 
find a significant difference in merger performance between firms revealing merger intention 
and others. Our finding is consistent with the capital need theory.  
Keywords: Merger Intention, Equity Issuance, Debt Issuance, Mergers & Acquisitions, and 
Event Studies  
JEL Classification: G14; G34. 
 
*Corresponding author: Xing Wang, Durham Business School, Mill Hill Lane, Durham, UK, 
DH1 3LB, phone: +44 (0) 1913345200, fax: +44 (0) 1913345201, e-mail: 
xing.wang@durham.ac.uk. We are grateful to Yichen Li, Pei Liu, Changyun Wang, Dimitris 
Petmezas, and the participants of the 2016 Midwest Finance Association Annual 
Conference,2016 Eastern Finance Association Annual Conference as well as well as seminars 
at Durham University, Surrey University, Strathclyde University, Renmin University, Beijing 
University  for their helpful comments and suggestions in an earlier version of the paper. Any 
remaining error is ours. 
 
3 
 
1. Introduction 
The Securities and Exchange Commission requires a firm to disclose the intention of proceeds 
usage for debt or equity offering. With a large degree of discretion over content, issuers have 
the option to voluntarily reveal either specific intentions or vague generalisation. The main 
interest of this paper is the disclosure of acquisition intention at debt or equity issuance and its 
relation to the subsequent acquisition performance. 
As strategic moves, mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are generally kept secret before deal 
announcement because the disclosure may contain proprietary message and limit a firm’s 
flexibility. However, approximately one-fifth of US public acquirers reveal their M&As 
intention in advance at pre-merger issuance over the period 1985-2015. Consequently, several 
questions have been raised. Why would a firm be willing to reveal its acquisition plan at 
issuance? Does the disclosed acquisition intention have economic impacts on the follow-on 
takeover? 
Previous studies mainly focus on information disclosure around merger announcement. There 
is little evidence on the disclosed merger intention at pre-deal issuance, which might serve as 
an important channel to obtain corporate information for forecasting. On the one hand, by 
disclosing merger intention, managers may credibly communicate with investors that they 
would allocate the proceeds efficiently. Therefore, the disclosed information can be used to 
signal that the subsequent merger transaction is a value-enhancing project (Walker & Yost 
2008; Autore et al. 2009).  
On the other hand, instead of conveying credible information, the capital need theory suggests 
that firms disclose merger intention at issuance simply for raising more capital.1 Cumming and 
Walz (2010) find that fund managers tend to voluntarily disclose an inflated valuation of the 
unsold private equity investment to acquirer more funds. Similarly, by catering to investors’ 
preferences for conglomerates (Baker et al. 2009), the acquisition intention might be stated for 
raising higher proceeds at issuance. With higher cash reserves, bidders would face fewer 
obstacles during the negotiation with target firms. Therefore, the revealed merger plan may 
facilitate a follow-on merger to some extent, e.g. a higher completion rate, but is not necessarily 
related to a superior performance.  
                                                          
1 The capital need theory argues that greater disclosure helps firms raise capital at a low cost, for example Diamond 
and Verrecchia (1991) and Botosan (1997). 
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This study employs a sample of 8,903 U.S. mergers and acquisitions over the period 1985-
2015. Our analysis shows that issuers announcing merger intention raise more capital but after 
that they conduct smaller takeover. Next, we find that the revealed merger intention at pre-deal 
issuance is associated with a higher probability of follow-on acquisition success and a higher 
takeover premium. However, such higher completion rates and higher premiums do not 
indicate a value-increasing merger transaction. Our analyses show that acquirers with the 
disclosed merger intention experience significant lower abnormal returns in both the short-run 
and long-run. Overall our findings suggest that the revealed acquisition intention at issuing 
activity is mainly for raising higher proceeds, rather than signalling good investment, which is 
consistent with the capital need theory. 
Our study contributes to literature in several ways. First, to the best of our knowledge, it is the 
first study to investigate the motivation behind the disclosed merger intention at issuance and 
provide evidence of how effectively the proceeds are allocated afterwards. Second, unlike 
previous research focusing on the disclosure around merger announcement, our study examines 
the disclosed information at pre-merger issuance, enabling us to investigate takeovers from an 
earlier stage. Third, our paper contributes to the literature by introducing the disclosed merger 
intention to the existing framework of the capital structure and firm value (Myers 1984; Jensen 
& Smith 1985; Malcolm Baker & Wurgler 2002).  
 
2. Hypothesis Development 
Prior research shows that the motivation of voluntary disclosure arises from two conflicting 
strategies. On the one hand, firms disclose merger intention at issuance to convey a favourable 
information that they will efficiently allocate the proceeds to a value-increasing deal (Walker 
& Yost 2008; Autore et al. 2009). On the other hand, the intention to conduct acquisition is 
revealed for catering to the preferences of investors on M&As, which is actually aimed at a 
larger issue size. Building on these views, we first investigate issue size and propose two 
competing hypotheses:  
H1a: Disclosure of merger intention in the prospectus will have no effect on issue size. 
H1b: Disclosure of merger intention in the prospectus will positively influence issue size. 
Walker et al. (2016) suggest that a firm disclosing specific investment intention should achieve 
it afterwards, which helps the firm build credibility with investors. On the contrary, firms who 
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reveal future move without successful action would experience a loss of trust among investors 
and face a higher future financing cost. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H2: Acquirers of revealed deals have higher success rate than non-revealed deals. 
Previous studies, e.g. Betton et al. (2008), argue that the realized benefit of merger transaction 
has a positive influence on the takeover premium. Additionally, to facilitate merger completion, 
acquirers would also tend to offer a higher price for target firm. Therefore, we would expect 
that: 
H3: Acquirers of revealed deals pay higher premiums than non-revealed deals. 
Different motivations behind the disclosed merger intention can lead to different performance 
of follow-on mergers. For firms who attempt to credibly signal good investment via the 
disclosure on proceeds usage at issuance, we hypothesize that:  
H4a: Acquirers of revealed deals will enjoy better performance than acquirers of non-revealed 
deals. 
In contrast, if firms’ management make use of the disclosed merger intention to deceive the 
market and raise more capital, we would expect that: 
H4b: Acquirers of revealed deals will suffer worse performance than acquirers of non-revealed 
deals. 
 
3. Data  
3.1 Dataset construction 
The sample includes U.S. mergers and acquisitions over the period 1985-2015 from Thomson 
One. Acquirers are public firms and have stock price data and financial data from the CRSP 
and COMPUSTAT database, respectively. The transaction value is at least $1 million, in which 
the target is a public firm, a private firm, or a subsidiary of a public firm. Following these 
criteria, we construct a M&As dataset of 62,182 deals. 
The data on issuance includes U.S. public equity and debt offerings over the period 1982-2015 
from Thomson One. The time frame is selected as we consider issuance conducted during three 
years before the first listed deal in the M&As dataset. Next, we identify the disclosed merger 
intention via the SDC data item ‘use of proceeds’ which is labelled ‘Future Acquisitions’. A 
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dummy variable Intention is constructed, equalling 1 if the firm state merger intention at 
issuance, and 0 otherwise. Finally, we obtain a sample of 203,839 issuance.  
We use the CUSIP of acquirers and issuers to match a firm’s acquisition with its pre-deal 
issuance, respectively. For each acquisition, any issuance following are removed and only the 
most recent equity or debt issuance is included. Next, as the financing decision before merger 
can have signal effect, we construct a dummy variable Debt for whether the type of pre-merger 
issuance is debt, and exclude any firms that issued both equity and debt during the three-year 
before merger announcement. The union of these data lead to a final sample of 8903 M&As 
deals.  
 
3.2 Summary statistics 
 [Insert Table 1 Here] 
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the sample. To assess the impact of merger intention 
disclosure, our sample is divided into two sub-samples – those with revealed acquisition 
intention at pre-merger issuance (henceforth “revealed deals”) and those without such 
disclosure (henceforth “non-revealed deals”). In general, the evidence indicates remarkable 
differences between the sub-groups. Panel A and B show that firms of revealed deals 
significantly show a lower market value, leverage ratio, and cash flow ratio compared to ones 
of non-revealed deals. Panel C shows that the transaction value of revealed deals is 
considerably smaller, which might be attributed to the smaller bidder size. With smaller deal 
size, however, the proceeds size indicates that acquirers of revealed deals actually raise more 
capital at pre-merger issuance than ones of non-revealed group (Proceeds Ratio for the two 
groups are 4.32 and 3.78, respectively). The larger issuing size might be due to the fact that 
there is a need for more capital to prepare for a profitable growth opportunity (Ambarish et al. 
1987). Alternatively, firms might simply increase liquidity. Table 1 also shows that bidders of 
revealed deals enjoy a remarkable higher completion rate (by 8.6%) and pay a higher premium 
(by 3.3%) compared to the non-revealed group. The evidence is preliminarily consistent with 
hypotheses H1b, H2 and H3.  
 
4. Empirical analysis 
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4.1 Does the disclosure of merger intention in the prospectus influence the size of offering?  
 [Insert Table 2 Here] 
Table 2 presents the results of regression in which we investigate the link between the disclosed 
merger intention and the logarithm of issuing size. We observe that Intention significantly 
positively determines the issue size at the 1% level in all specifications, regardless of the 
issuance type, which is consistent with H1b. This finding suggests that issuers obtain more 
funds when they disclose the intention to fund future acquisitions, which might be explained 
by considering that the voluntary disclosure on proceeds usage reduces the asymmetric 
information and therefore leading to a lower cost. In terms of control variables, the signs are 
discussed in Appendix 2. 
 
4.2 Does the disclosure of merger intention at pre-deal issuance help predict the 
probability of takeover success?   
 [Insert Table 3 Here] 
Table 3 presents marginal effects of the probit model in which we relate the disclosed merger 
intention to takeover success. We observe significant positive coefficients on the variable 
Intention in all specifications, indicating that the probability of completing a merger increases 
with the presence of revealed intention at pre-merger issuance. After accounting for acquirer’s 
and deal’s characteristics, the marginal effect of Intention in Column 3 suggests that acquirers 
of revealed deals are 6.94% more likely to complete the deal than their counterparts of non-
revealed deals, which is in line with H2. This can be explained by considering that acquirers 
of revealed deals should be more willing to complete mergers in order to build credibility with 
the market and avoid higher future financing costs (Walker et al. 2016). A discussion of the 
control variables is shown in Appendix 3. 
 
4.3 Does the disclosure of merger intention at pre-deal issuance influence takeover 
premiums? 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
Table 4 displays the results of OLS regression where the takeover premium is regressed by the 
disclosed merger intention and other control variables. Consistent with the previous univariate 
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results and H3, we observe that the coefficient associated with Intention is positive and 
significantly different from zero in all specifications. More specifically, bidders revealing 
merger intention at debt or equity issuance remarkably pay a 2.78% higher premium than their 
non-revealing counterparts in the specification 3 with the firm and deal characteristics 
controlled for. This finding can be explained by considering that acquirers of revealed deals 
pay more to facilitate deal completion. Additionally, if the disclosed merger intention at 
issuance is driven by signalling the higher quality of subsequent deal, acquirers of revealed 
deals will pay more in return for higher synergies than ones in non-revealed deals (Betton et 
al. 2008). As for results on control variables, we include a discussion in Appendix 4.  
 
4.4 Does the disclosure of merger intention at pre-deal issuance influence the valuation 
effects of takeovers? 
4.4.1 Short-run analysis 
 [Insert Table 5 Here] 
This section employs short-window event study to examine stock market reactions to merger 
announcements. Table 5 shows the results of OLS regression where the dependent variable is 
acquirers’ 5-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). In all three models, the coefficient on 
Intention is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that acquirers with 
revealed merger intention experience lower announcement returns than their counterparts 
without such disclosure. Specifically, the announcement effect is 0.96% worse for acquirers 
with the revealed merger intention in specification 3 with related explanatory variables 
accounted for. This finding is supportive of H4b and the univariate tests. A discussion of the 
control variables is presented in Appendix 5.  
4.4.2 Long-run analysis 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
Table 6 presents the results of the long-term OLS regression analysis. Following Lyon et al. 
(1999), this paper uses size-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) and calculate 
the bootstrapped t-statistics. Additionally, only completed takeover is included. Overall, we 
find that the coefficient on Intention is negative and significant in all specifications, which is 
consistent with the univariate analysis and H4b. Specifically, the disclosure of merger intention 
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worsens acquirer’s long-run stock performance by 9.51% after controlling for firm and deal 
characteristics. This finding indicates that the disclosure of merger intention is not related to a 
future value-enhancing takeover. Instead, acquirers of revealed deals suffer a worse 
performance in the long run, suggesting that managers might simply make use of the disclosure 
to deceive the market and raise more capital. Following the disclosure, acquisitions are carried 
due to pre-commitment instead of value creation. With regard to control variables, the results 
are discussed in Appendix 6.  
 
4.5 Endogeneity issue 
Previous results suggest that instead of increasing shareholder value, acquirers completing deal 
merely to meet the commitment made at earlier issuance. However, establishing a causal 
relationship between the revealed takeover intention and deal completion requires a 
consideration of the endogeneity arising from reverse causality. To address this issue, we 
conduct the instrumental variable Probit model and employ the experience of disclosing merger 
intention (D_Experience), i.e. the total number of a firm’s earlier issuances with disclosed 
merger intention, as the instrumental variable.  
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
As shown in Table 7, the probability of takeover success considerably increases with the 
decision to reveal takeover intention at pre-deal issuance, confirming our previous results. 
Additionally, the significant estimates from Wald test and Anderson-Rubin Wald test 
respectively provide evidence that we can reject the null hypothesis of no endogeneity and that 
D_Experience is a valid instrument variable. Other control variables have similar signs to the 
previous results of deal completion.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the relation between the disclosure of merger intention at pre-merger 
issuance and its follow-on M&As. By building the link between pre-merger issuance and 
merger activity, our paper is able to examine takeovers from their financing stage, which draws 
a more complete picture. Specifically, we find that firms disclosing merger intention tend to 
have a larger issuing size than ones not disclosing, though their subsequent takeover has a 
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significant smaller transaction value. Second, our results show that acquirers who disclose 
merger intention at the earlier issuance are more likely to complete deals and significantly pay 
a higher premium. Moreover, our evidence shows that acquirers of revealed deals experience 
a significant lower short-run and long-run performance than ones of non-revealed deals. 
Overall, our results indicate that disclosing merger intention at pre-merger issuing is largely 
for the purpose of raising higher proceeds, instead of conveying valuable information regarding 
the efficiency of the proceeds usage, which is consistent with the capital need theory. 
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Appendix 1: Definitions of the variables used 
Variable Definition 
Panel A:  
Dependent Variables  
 
Issue Size The logarithm of total issuing proceeds. 
Deal Completion Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if merger transaction 
is completed. 
Takeover Premium We specify the premium as the difference between offer price 
and the target’s stock price 4 weeks before the announcement 
divided by the target’s stock price 4 weeks before the 
announcement. 
Acquirer CAR [-2, +2] Cumulative abnormal return of the acquiring firm in the 5-day 
event window (−2, +2) surrounded on the announcement day. 
The expected returns are from a Fama-French 5 factors model 
with the parameters estimated over 240 trading days ending 50 
days before the announcement. As benchmark we use the 
CRSP value-weighted index. 
Acquirer BHAR36 Buy-and-hold abnormal return of the acquiring firm from size-
adjusted model in the 36-month event window following the 
announcement.  
Panel B:  
Key independent variable 
 
Intention Dummy variable that equals 1 if acquirers disclose merger 
intention at pre-merger debt or equity issuance. 
Panel C:  
Firm characteristics 
 
I_LNMV The logarithm of the issuer market value measured 4 weeks 
before the issuance. The market value is calculated as the 
number of shares outstanding multiplied by the respective 
stock price at 4 weeks before the issuance announcement. 
I_TobinQ We specify Tobin's Q as the ratio of market value by book 
value of the issuer's assets. 
I_Leverage The ratio of total debt by total capital at the fiscal year end 
before the issuance announcement. 
I_CF2TA The ratio of cash flows by the total assets at the fiscal year end 
before the issuance announcement. 
I_Earnings The ratio of earnings before interest and taxes by total assets at 
the fiscal year end before the issuance announcement.. 
I_FundingDeficit Following Frank and Goyal (2003), we specify the funding 
deficit as the sum of cash dividends, net investment and change 
in working capital less the internal cash flow at the fiscal year 
end before the issuance announcement.  
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I_Rating The Standards & Poor’s long-term credit ratings of the issuers 
in numerical formal. AAA corresponds to 1, AA+ corresponds 
to 2, AA corresponds to 3, and so on.  
I_Tax The ratio of income taxes by total assets at the fiscal year end 
before the issuance announcement. 
I_Runup The market-adjusted return of issuing firms over the period 
from 200 trading days to 2 months before the issuance 
announcement.  
Ln(TradingVolume) The logarithm of the average monthly trading volume in the 
six months before the issuance announcement.  
A_LNMV The logarithm of the acquirer market value measured 4 weeks 
before the merger announcement. The market value is 
calculated as the number of shares outstanding multiplied by 
the respective stock price at 4 weeks before the M&As 
announcement. 
A_TobinQ We specify Tobin's Q as the ratio of market value by book 
value of the acquirer's assets. 
A_Leverage The ratio of acquirer’s total debt by total capital at the fiscal 
year end before the M&As announcement. 
A_CF2TA The ratio of acquirer’s cash flows by the total assets at the 
fiscal year end before the M&As announcement. 
T_LNMV The logarithm of the target market value measured 4 weeks 
before the merger announcement. The market value is 
calculated as the number of shares outstanding multiplied by 
the respective stock price at 4 weeks before the M&As 
announcement. 
T_TobinQ We specify Tobin's Q as the ratio of market value by book 
value of the target's assets. 
T_Leverage The ratio of target’s total debt by total capital at the fiscal year 
end before the M&As announcement. 
T_CF2TA The ratio of target’s cash flows by the total assets at the fiscal 
year end before the M&As announcement. 
T_52WeekHigh Following Baker et al. (2012), this variable is defined as the 
percentage difference of the target’s 52-week high stock price 
over the stock price 4 weeks before the M&As announcement.  
Panel D:  
Deal characteristics 
 
Proceeds Ratio The variable was calculated as the value of proceeds raised at 
pre-merger issuance divided by the transaction value of 
merger.  
Ln(TransactionValue) The logarithm of the merger transaction value.  
Yield Three-month U.S. Treasury Bill yield before the issuance 
announcement. 
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MV Following Bouwman et al. (2009), we identify high-, neutral- 
and low-valuation markets by comparing the detrended P/E 
ratio of the value-weighted market index with its past 5-year 
average. 
Relative Size The variable was calculated as merger transaction value 
divided by the acquirer market value of equity 4 weeks before 
the merger announcement.  
Hostile Dummy variable that equals 1 if the M&As deal attitude is 
identified as hostile. 
Stock Dummy variable that equals 1 if the M&As deal is 100% paid 
by stock. 
Competing Bid Dummy variable that equals 1 if there are more than one 
bidder. 
Private Dummy variable that equals 1 if the target is a private firm. 
Tender Dummy variable that equals 1 if the M&As deal is identified 
as a tender offer. 
Diversification Dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquirer and the target 
have the different first two-digit of primary SIC code. 
Debt Dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquirer has issued debt 
before merger.  
Financial Crisis Dummy variable that equals 1 if the M&As deal is conducted 
during the period between 2007 and 2009. 
Panel E:  
Instrumental variables 
 
D_Experience The total number of a firm’s earlier issuance with disclosed 
merger intention. 
 
 
Appendix 2: Other determinants of issue size 
Focusing on other control variables included in Table 2, we observe that there is a significant 
and positive relation between firm size and offering size in all specifications, which is 
supportive of MacKie-Mason (1990) suggesting that asymmetric information and financial 
distress costs decrease as firm size increase. Next, we find a positive coefficient related to the 
I_FundingDeficit variable, which is consistent with the pecking order theory of Myers and 
Majluf (1984). They argue that firms with insufficient retained earnings would turn to external 
financing, i.e. debt and equity via capital market. Moreover, the coefficient on the variable 
I_Leverage is significantly positive in the regressions of debt offering size, which indicates that 
firms issuing more debt have higher leverage ratio. This can be explained by the fact that firms 
with high level of leverage ratio also have high leverage targets or frequently weak cash flows 
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(Galizia & O’Brien 2001). Further, we find that issue size is positively associated with the deal 
value of subsequent merger, and this effect is significant in equity issuance. This suggests that 
firms would raise external financing, especially external equity, to fund the following 
acquisition. In terms of debt-related financing cost, we observe that the variable I_Rating 
exhibits a considerable positive coefficient, which is in line with the literature suggesting that 
firms with better credit quality enjoy lower financing cost (Kisgen 2006). As for equity 
issuance, the issue size is also positively determined by firm’s trading volume 
(I_TradingVolume) which is a proxy for stock liquidity, and the effect is significant at the 1% 
level. Butler et al. (2005) document that higher liquidity leads to a reduction in adverse 
selection, and thus a lower financing cost.  
 
Appendix 3: Other determinants of takeover completion 
Examining the control variables, the results on most of the deal characteristics in specification 
3 of Table 3 show significant signs. In particular, the most significant predictor of completion 
is the private deal indicator (Private), which presents a positive coefficient with a z-statistic of 
37.27. This suggests that the likelihood of completing a merger increases when the target firm 
is a private one. In addition to the role played by the private target, the results in column 3 also 
show that the coefficients on A_LNMV, Proceeds Ratio, Stock, Tender, and Diversification are 
positive and significant. These results indicate that larger acquirers with larger pre-merger 
issuing sizes, the choice of stock payment, the choice of tender offer, and the choice of target 
firms in other industries tend to complete mergers. In contrast, the results on Hostile and 
Competing Bid have negative and significant signs, which suggest that acquirers in hostile 
takeover and deals with multiple bidders are less likely to complete mergers.   
 
Appendix 4: Other determinants of takeover premium 
The results in Table 4 show that there is a significant and positive relation between 
T_52WeekHigh and takeover premium, which is consistent with Baker et al. (2012). The 
coefficient suggests that a 10% increase in T_52WeekHigh is related to a 0.47% higher bid 
premiums. We also observe that the coefficients on other control variables are generally in 
accordance with prior literature. Specifically, the Competing Bid is shown to be a significant 
and positive coefficient, suggesting that bid premiums tend to be higher in deals with multiple 
acquirers as there are more firms bidding up the price (Bulow & Klemperer 1996; Alexandridis 
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et al. 2010). In addition, the coefficient on the deal attitude indicator (Hostile) is positive and 
significant, which suggests that bidders conducting hostile takeover pay a higher price to obtain 
target shareholder’s approval. Another possible explanation may be that the defence strategy 
employed by target firms can bring new bidders and arouse competition, leading to higher bid 
premium (Jarrell 1985; Schwert 2000). Moreover, the evidence on the method of payment 
indicates that there is a positive relation between stock payment and offer premium, which is 
consistent with the overvaluation hypothesis of Myers and Majluf (1984).   
 
Appendix 5: Other determinants of bidders’ CARs 
As for firm-specific factors, the result shows that the announcement returns decrease with the 
larger size of acquirers in columns 2 and 3 of Table 5 (A_LNMV). This can be explained by the 
fact that the role of managerial hubris playing in the decisions of large firms may result in 
value-destroying deals (Moeller et al. 2004). We also observe that the coefficient on A_TobinQ 
is significant and negative in columns 2 and 3, suggesting that this ratio captures more 
information on stock overvaluation than investment opportunities (Myers & Majluf 1984). 
Another variable significantly negatively associated with the acquirer’s CARs is acquirer’s 
cash flow ratio (A_CF2TA). This finding is in line with Harford (1999) who argues that 
acquiring firms with higher cash flow experience lower abnormal returns. 
In terms of deal characteristics, our evidence shows that the use of stock payments in 
acquisitions is related to 1.47% lower announcement returns, which is consistent with Travlos 
(1987). In addition, we find that Debt is positively related to CARs, which is significant at the 
10% level. The finding indicates that a market inferring pre-merger debt issue is a favourable 
signal. Consistent with Grossman and Hart (1982), this can be explained by the fact that debt 
financing offers managers a strong incentive to act in the shareholders’ interest.  
 
Appendix 6: Other determinants of bidders’ BHARs 
With regard to control variables, the result shows a significant positive coefficient on A_CF2TA 
in regressions 2 and 3 of Table 6, which is in contrast to the evidence of the short-term analysis. 
This evidence suggest that the market reactions are more favourable to acquirers with better 
pre-merger operations. In addition, the coefficient on Debt is positive and significant at the 1% 
level, which is consistent with the result in the short-run analysis. This finding indicate that 
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issuing debt before a merger can improve the performance of follow-on mergers, which 
provides supportive evidence for agency theory that debt issuance leads to effective 
management (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Grossman & Hart 1982). 
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Table 1 – Summary statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics of 8903 U.S. M&A samples with acquirers that engaged in debt or equity issuance during the three years 
before merger announcement. Panel A reporting issuer related firm characteristics. Panel B reporting acquirer related characteristics. Panel C 
reporting issuance and merger deal related characteristics. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. M&A deals are restricted by the following 
criteria. First, the announcement date is between January 1, 1985 and December 31, 2015. Second, the acquirer is a public firms and the target 
firm can be public, private or subsidiary. Then, all completed and withdrawn deals with a deal value of at least $1 million are considered. First, 
we present the values for the full sample. Next, we sub-divide our sample based on whether acquirers reveal merger intention at pre-merger debt 
or equity issuance. The Student’s t-test is used to test for statistical significance. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
 
Full Sample  
(I) 
Revealed Deals  
(II) 
Non-revealed Deals 
(III) (III) – (II) 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
   
Difference 
Panel A – Issuer related           
I_LNMV 8610 6.96 2.01 1477 6.43 1.80 7131 7.07 2.03 0.64*** 
I_TobinQ 7263 2.95 3.81 1249 3.16 4.10 6014 2.90 3.75 -0.26** 
I_Earnings 6974 9.47% 0.21 1217 8.11% 0.22 5757 9.75% 0.21 1.64%** 
I_FundingDeficit 2691 0.10 0.26 519 0.10 0.26 2172 0.10 0.27 0.00 
I_Leverage 8100 38.48% 0.31 1402 34.95% 0.33 6698 39.22% 0.30 4.27%*** 
I_CF2TA 7582 3.03% 0.23 1318 1.89% 0.25 6264 3.27% 0.22 1.38%* 
Panel B - Acquirer related           
A_LNMV 8610 6.99 2.01 1477 6.53 1.80 7133 7.08 2.03 0.55*** 
A_TobinQ 7263 2.79 3.40 1249 2.82 2.93 6014 2.78 3.48 -0.04 
A_Leverage 8100 39.25% 0.30 1402 34.85% 0.29 6698 40.18% 0.30 5.33%*** 
A_CF2TA 7582 3.54% 0.23 1318 2.36% 0.30 6264 3.79% 0.21 1.44%** 
Panel C - Deal related           
Transaction Value ($million) 8903 550.12 1530.11 1521 380 1150 7382 585.17 1595.05 205.17*** 
Relative Size 8610 0.22 0.94 1477 0.28 1.24 7133 0.21 0.87 -0.07*** 
Premium 3410 21.73% 19.89 468 24.54% 20.55 2942 21.28% 19.75 -3.26%*** 
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All Cash Deals 5477 61.52% 0.49 821 53.98% 0.50 4656 63.07% 0.48 9.09%*** 
All Stock Deals  1394 15.66% 0.36 240 15.78% 0.36 1154 15.63% 0.36 -0.15% 
Mixed Deals 2032 22.82% 0.42 460 30.24% 0.46 1572 21.30% 0.41 -8.95%*** 
Public 5178 58.16% 0.49 704 46.29% 0.50 4474 60.61% 0.49 14.32%*** 
Private 2233 25.08% 0.43 504 33.14% 0.47 1729 23.42% 0.42 -9.71%*** 
Subsidiary 1492 16.76% 0.37 313 20.58% 0.40 1179 15.97% 0.37 -4.61%*** 
Competing Bid  159 1.79% 0.13 33 2.17% 0.15 126 1.71% 0.13 -0.46% 
Hostile 94 1.06% 0.10 15 0.99% 0.10 79 1.07% 0.10 0.08% 
Tender Offer 381 4.28% 0.20 41 2.70% 0.16 340 4.61% 0.21 1.91%*** 
Diversification 2202 24.73% 0.43 412 27.09% 0.44 1790 24.25% 0.43 -2.84%** 
Completed 5498 61.75% 0.49 1048 68.90% 0.46 4450 60.28% 0.49 -8.62%*** 
Proceeds Ratio  8899 3.87 7.34 1519 4.32 7.76 7380 3.78 7.25 -0.54*** 
Debt 4071 45.72% 0.50 430 28.27% 0.45 3641 49.32% 0.50 21.05%*** 
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Table 2: OLS regressions of firm’s pre-merger issue size 
This table reports results of OLS regressions of acquirer’s pre-merger issue size. The dependent 
variable in Model (1) and (2) is the logarithm of the proceeds at debt issuance. The dependent 
variable in Model (3) and (4) is the logarithm of the proceeds at equity issuance. The key 
independent variable Intention equals to one if issuers include future acquisition as one of the 
proceeds usage, zero otherwise. All models include industry and year fixed effects. All other 
variables are defined in Appendix 1. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 
99% levels. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
Issue Size Debt  Debt Equity Equity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intention 0.4966*** 0.3869*** 0.1875*** 0.1303**  
 (4.86) (3.29) (4.38) (2.01) 
I_LNMV 0.3407*** 0.3897*** 0.6568*** 0.5373*** 
 1(2.76) (9.67) 4(1.43) 1(7.91) 
I_TobinQ -0.003 -0.0017 -0.0046* -0.0035 
 (-0.49) (-0.25)    (-1.80) (-0.84)    
I_Earnings -0.668 0.3393 0.2819* 0.2205 
 (-1.23) (0.34) (1.94) (0.99) 
I_FundingDeficit 0.1854 -0.1485 0.2160*** 0.1367 
 (0.67) (-0.42)    (2.82) (1.20) 
I_Leverage 0.3846*** -0.0603 0.1374** 0.0653 
 (3.09) (-0.38)    (2.50) (0.87) 
I_CF2TA -0.0281 -1.0042 0.1875 0.2165 
 (-0.06) (-1.19)    (1.59) (1.24) 
Ln(TransactionValue) 0.0179 0.0025 0.0552*** 0.0688*** 
 (0.79) (0.10) (4.11) (3.33) 
Yield  -0.002                  
  (-0.07)                     
I_Rating  -0.1779***                  
  (-3.53)                     
I_Tax  -1.6235                  
  (-0.76)                     
I_Runup    -0.058 
    (-1.49)    
Ln(TradingVolume)    0.1327*** 
    (4.79) 
MV    0.0478 
    (1.24) 
Constant -150.2455*** -127.7381*** 13.6711** 9.0462 
 (-15.41) (-6.31)    (2.33) (0.94) 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 796 588 1528 608 
Adjusted R2 0.537 0.480 0.720 0.735 
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Table 3 – Probit models of deal completion 
This table reports results of probit regressions of deal completion. All models regress the Deal 
Completion dummy against the key dummy variable Intention indicating if acquirers disclose 
merger intention at pre-merger debt or equity issuance. Deal Completion dummy equals one if 
the takeover transaction is completed, and zero otherwise. Model 1 only includes the key 
independent variable Intention; Model 2 and 3 further control for firm and deal characteristics. 
All models include industry and year fixed effects. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The table reports marginal 
effects and t-statistics (in parentheses). Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted 
by ***, ** and * respectively. 
Deal Completion Model Model Model 
   (1)  (2)    (3)             
Intention 0.1107*** 0.1025*** 0.0694*** 
 (8.50) (6.66) (5.03) 
Acquirer Ln(MV)  -0.0027 0.0149*** 
  (-0.81) (4.13) 
Acquirer Tobin’s Q  0.0094*** 0.0021 
  (4.83) (0.97) 
Acquirer Leverage  -0.0418** 0.0166 
  (-2.00) (0.75) 
Acquirer Cash Flows to Total Assets  -0.1225*** 0.0498 
  (-3.90) (1.57) 
Proceeds Ratio   0.0016*   
   (1.71) 
Relative Size   -0.0102 
   (-1.44)    
Hostile   -0.6007*** 
   (-17.27)    
Stock   0.2324*** 
   (15.75) 
Competing Bid   -0.1048*   
   (-1.80)    
Private   0.3871*** 
   (37.27) 
Tender   0.2975*** 
   (26.08) 
Diversification   0.3281*** 
   (29.09) 
    
Yearly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8903 6632 6628 
Chi2 246.5234 227.8177 2427.826 
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Table 4 – OLS regressions of takeover premium 
This table reports results of OLS regressions of takeover premium. All models regress takeover 
premium against the key dummy variable Intention indicating if acquirers disclose merger 
intention at pre-merger debt or equity issuance. Takeover premium is computed as the 
difference between offer price and the target’s stock price 4 weeks before the announcement 
divided by the target’s stock price 4 weeks before the announcement. Model 1 only includes 
the key independent variable Intention; Model 2 and 3 further control for firm and deal 
characteristics. 52-week high, as a variable affecting the premium, is calculated as the 
percentage difference between the 52-week high share price and the target’s stock price 4 
weeks before the deal announcement. All models include industry and year fixed effects. All 
variables are defined in Appendix 1. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 
99% levels. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively.  
Takeover Premium Model Model Model 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Intention 0.0347*** 0.0330*** 0.0278*** 
 (3.49) (3.17) (2.93) 
A_LNMV  0.0585*** 0.0493*** 
  (21.95) (16.74) 
A_TobinQ  0.0044** 0.0033**  
  (2.45) (2.04) 
A_Leverage  -0.0303 -0.0107 
  (-1.53) (-0.59)    
A_CF2TA  -0.0077 0.019 
  (-0.23) (0.62) 
T_LNMV  -0.0743*** -0.0653*** 
  (-28.11) (-21.87)    
T_TobinQ  0.0019 0.0026 
  (0.96) (1.44) 
T_Leverage  0.0315* 0.0212 
  (1.72) (1.27) 
T_CF2TA  0.0247 0.009 
  (1.03) (0.41) 
T_52WeekHigh   0.0471*** 
   (5.01) 
Proceeds Ratio   -0.0042*** 
   (-7.19)    
Relative Size   0.0304*** 
   (8.20) 
Hostile   0.1208*** 
   (5.35) 
Stock   0.0445*** 
   (4.42) 
Competing Bid   0.1269*** 
   (6.74) 
Private   -0.0613 
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   (-0.92)    
Tender   0.0802*** 
   (7.40) 
Diversification   0.0239**  
   (2.23) 
Constant 2.0398** -2.0928** -3.6674*** 
 (2.25) (-2.09) (-3.99)    
    
Yearly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3410 2214 2212 
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.293 0.418 
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Table 5 – OLS regressions of acquirer short-term performance 
This table reports results of OLS regressions of acquirer’s cumulative abnormal returns. All 
models regress the five-day CAR against the key dummy variable Intention indicating if 
acquirers disclose merger intention at pre-merger debt or equity issuance. Model 1 only 
includes the key independent variable Intention; Model 2 and 3 further control for firm and 
deal characteristics. All models include industry and year fixed effects. All variables are 
defined in Appendix 1. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by 
***, ** and * respectively. 
Acquirer CAR [-2, +2] Model Model Model 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Intention -0.0057** -0.0103*** -0.0096*** 
 (-2.22) (-3.37) (-3.12)    
A_LNMV  -0.0046*** -0.0051*** 
  (-7.42) (-6.87)    
A_TobinQ  -0.0013*** -0.0010*** 
  (-3.93) (-2.94)    
A_Leverage  0.0038 0.0006 
  (0.95) (0.15) 
A_CF2TA  -0.0166*** -0.0231*** 
  (-3.03) (-4.19)    
Proceeds Ratio   0.0000 
   (0.08) 
Relative Size   0.0021 
   (1.54) 
Hostile   -0.0207*  
   (-1.75)    
Stock   -0.0147*** 
   (-4.25)    
Competing Bid   -0.0276*** 
   (-2.88)    
Private   0.0011 
   (0.41) 
Tender   0.0110*  
   (1.94) 
Diversification   -0.0052**  
   (-1.89)    
Debt   0.0055*  
   (1.89) 
Financial Crisis   0.0020 
   (0.49) 
Constant -0.1251 -0.6274** -0.3166 
 (-0.50) (-1.99) (-0.96)    
    
Yearly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
27 
 
Observations 8903 6632 6628 
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.015 0.021 
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Table 6 – OLS regressions of acquirer long-term performance 
This table reports results of OLS regressions of acquirer’s long-run performance. All models 
regress the 36-month BHAR against the key dummy variable Intention indicating if acquirers 
disclose merger intention at pre-merger debt or equity issuance. Model 1 only includes the key 
independent variable Intention; Model 2 and 3 further control for firm and deal characteristics. 
All models include industry and year fixed effects. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and * 
respectively. 
Acquirer BHAR36 Model Model Model  
(1) (2) (3) 
Intention -0.0880*** -0.0876* -0.0951*   
(-2.76) (-1.81) (-1.81)    
A_LNMV 
 
0.0142 -0.0062 
 
 
(1.17) (-0.37)    
A_TobinQ 
 
-0.0103* -0.0065 
 
 
(-1.79) (-1.00)    
A_Leverage 
 
0.0185 -0.0465 
 
 
(0.25) (-0.49)    
A_CF2TA 
 
0.1911* 0.3463*  
 
 
(1.95) (1.89) 
Proceeds Ratio 
  
0.0053    
(0.77) 
Relative Size 
  
0.0371    
(0.71) 
Hostile 
  
0.0202    
(0.09)    
Stock 
  
-0.0749    
(-1.13)    
Competing Bid 
  
-0.0214    
(-0.19)    
Private 
  
0.0028    
(0.05) 
Tender 
  
-0.0810    
(-1.00)    
Diversification 
  
-0.0743    
(-1.72)    
Debt 
  
0.1834***    
(4.00) 
Financial Crisis   -0.0112 
   (-0.26) 
Constant 1.3459 -0.2622 -0.6694  
(0.43) (-0.06) (-0.16)    
    
Yearly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
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Observations 5123 3758 3755 
Adjusted R2 0 0.002 0.004 
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Table 7 IV regression of deal completion 
This table reports results of IV regression of deal completion. The model regresses the Deal 
Completion dummy against the key dummy variable Intention indicating if acquirers disclose 
merger intention at pre-merger debt or equity issuance. The instrumental variable is 
D_Experience, which represents the total number of merger intention that a firm disclosed 
before the issuance of our interest. All regressions include industry and year fixed effects. All 
variables are defined in Appendix 1. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 
99% levels. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
Deal Completion First Stage Second Stage 
      
Intention  0.0565*** 
  (4.19) 
A_LNMV -0.0268*** 0.0157*** 
 (-10.09) (4.91)    
A_TobinQ 0.0022 -0.0001 
 (1.5) (-0.08)    
A_Leverage -0.0621*** 0.0135 
 (-3.84) (0.72) 
A_CF2TA 0.0548** 0.0292  
 (2.44) (1.11)    
Proceeds Ratio 0.0015** 0.0005 
 (2.31) (0.67) 
Relative Size 0.0151*** -0.0113* 
 (2.71) (-1.94) 
Hostile 0.0106 -0.5259*** 
 (0.22) (-9.07) 
Stock -0.0262* -0.2184*** 
 (-1.88) (11.64) 
Competing Bid 0.0970** -0.1150** 
 (2.46) (-2.56)    
Private 0.0633*** 0.3887*** 
 (5.47) (26.37) 
Tender -0.0312 0.3827*** 
 (-1.35) (11.90)    
Diversification 0.0020 0.3179*** 
 (0.18) (21.87) 
D_Experience 0.0942***                 
 (21.70)                 
Constant -3.0361**  
 (-2.16)  
   
Yearly fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 6005 6005 
Wald test of exogeneity  0.00*** 
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Anderson-Rubin Wald test  0.00*** 
Chi2  1567.68 
 
 
